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Crane y la tesis reduccionista

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Crane y la tesis reduccionista Empty Crane y la tesis reduccionista

Mensaje por Manu Dom Nov 20, 2016 9:50 am

Tim Crane (2013) propone explicar la verdad de oraciones sobre cosas no-existentes caso por caso y en términos de otras verdades acerca de cosas que sí existen. Dos ejemplos:

"(3) Pegasus is a mythological winged horse; in the myth, Pegasus sprung into being from the blood of Medusa, the gorgon killed by Perseus.

To say this is true is to say that Pegasus has the pleonastic property of being a mythological horse. This is a representation-dependent property. For something to be a mythological horse, there must be a myth in which it is a horse [...] The existence of the myth representing Pegasus as such is sufficient to make it true that Pegasus is a mythological winged horse; and the way Pegasus is represented in the myth is also sufficient to make it true that in the myth the horse sprung into being from the blood of Medusa the gorgon. It is the existence of the real myth that guarantees that it is true that Pegasus has the representation-dependent properties of being a mythical horse.

[...]

(4) Siegfried is one of the most unappealing characters in all dramatic works.

This is true because the fictional character Siegfried has the pleonastic property of being an unappealing character. Being an unappealing character in a dramatic work is a representation-dependent pleonastic property, since characters in dramatic works only have properties because there are dramatic works in which they are characters. What explain the fact that Siegfried has this property are facts about the dramatic work itself. The last two parts of Wagner's Ring depict Siegfried as violent, willful, thoughtless, ignorant, and careless [...] Describing him as unappealing is a judgement based on these facts about what the stories say. Of course, it could be disputed. But in settling this dispute, the only facts participants need to appeal to are facts about the works themselves."

Una propiedad pleonástica (término de Schiffer) es una propiedad no-sustancial (frente a las sustanciales), y se caracterizan por no implicar existencia (son dependientes-de-representación).

¿Qué os parece esta estrategia? ¿Hay alguna diferencia significativa entre la explicación de la verdad del caso (3) y del (4)?

Manu
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